Exchange rates

Black Wednesday 1992 and the Limits of the Exchange Rate Mechanism

On 16 September 1992, the British government spent a day defending the pound's place in a European system of fixed bands, and then gave up. The reasons go back two years.

By the Sovereign Tradero editorial team Published Updated 5 min read

Picture this: a Wednesday evening in September 1992, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer stepping out in front of the Treasury to tell television cameras that Britain was suspending its membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism.

That day became known as Black Wednesday. It cost the government a large sum, damaged its reputation for economic competence and changed the way Britain runs monetary policy. To see why, we need to understand what the Exchange Rate Mechanism was, and why Britain had joined it.

What the ERM was

The Exchange Rate Mechanism, or ERM, was part of the European Monetary System set up in 1979. Each member currency had a central rate against the others, and a band within which it was allowed to move. If a currency approached the edge of its band, central banks were expected to act, by buying the weak currency, by raising interest rates, or both. If pressure became too strong, members could agree to realign the central rates.

In practice, the strongest currency in the system was the German Deutschmark, and the German central bank, the Bundesbank, set the tone for interest rates across Europe.

Why Britain joined in 1990

Britain had stayed out for a decade. By the late 1980s, inflation was rising again, and many in government believed that tying the pound to the Deutschmark would import some of Germany's reputation for low inflation. After long arguments inside the Cabinet, Britain joined on 8 October 1990, at a central rate of 2.95 Deutschmarks to the pound, with a wide band of 6 per cent either side.

The ERM band for sterling A horizontal band with an upper limit of about 3.13 Deutschmarks, a central rate of 2.95, and a lower limit of about 2.78. When sterling neared the lower limit, the Bank of England had to buy pounds and raise interest rates. Upper limit, about DM 3.13 Central rate, DM 2.95 Lower limit, about DM 2.78 duty to defend here
A concept view of the band, not a record of prices. Near the lower limit, the rules required action to support the pound.

Critics argued that the rate was too high for British industry, and that the timing was poor. Germany had just reunified, and the cost of rebuilding the east led the Bundesbank to keep interest rates high to hold down inflation. Britain, heading into a recession, needed lower rates. Inside the ERM, it could not easily have them.

Pressure builds through 1992

In June 1992, Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum, and doubts grew about the whole project of European monetary union. France scheduled its own referendum for 20 September. Investors and banks began to question whether weaker currencies, including sterling and the Italian lira, could hold their positions. The lira was devalued and then left the system that same week.

As sterling sank towards the bottom of its band, the Bank of England bought pounds with its foreign currency reserves. Large funds and banks sold sterling, reasoning that if the government could not hold the line, the pound would fall and they would be able to buy it back more cheaply. The more the market doubted the defence, the more expensive it became.

The government's options were limited. It could raise interest rates, which would hurt homeowners with variable mortgages in the middle of a recession. It could ask its partners for a realignment, which would mean admitting the original rate had been wrong. Or it could spend its reserves and hope the pressure eased after the French vote. In the days before Black Wednesday, it tried mainly the last of these.

Sixteen hours in September

On the morning of Wednesday 16 September, the government raised the Bank's base rate from 10 to 12 per cent. When that failed to stop the selling, it announced a further rise to 15 per cent that afternoon. Sterling still did not recover. That evening, Norman Lamont announced that Britain was suspending its membership of the ERM. The rise to 15 per cent never took effect, and rates returned to 10 per cent the next day.

Official papers released in 2005 put the cost to the Treasury at about £3.3 billion. The political cost was larger: the government's reputation for economic management was badly damaged, and the episode remained a reference point in British politics for years.

What came next

The pound fell sharply after leaving the ERM, and interest rates came down. In October 1992 the government adopted something new for Britain: an explicit target for inflation. Instead of tying the pound to another currency, monetary policy would aim at a published range for price rises. In 1997 the next step followed, when the Bank of England was given operational independence to set interest rates through its Monetary Policy Committee.

Economists still debate whether Black Wednesday helped Britain's recovery or simply reflected an error made in 1990. Many argue that the lower interest rates that followed supported growth in the mid-1990s.

Others point to the human side of the story: households that had borrowed heavily in the late 1980s faced high mortgage rates throughout the ERM period, and many lost their homes during the recession.

The lesson about fixed rates

Black Wednesday shows the core difficulty of a fixed exchange rate: it asks a country to set interest rates for the sake of the currency, even when the economy at home needs something else. When markets doubt that a government will accept that trade-off, the defence can become very costly very quickly. The episode is a large part of why Britain has relied on an inflation target, rather than a currency peg, ever since.

This article is educational content about economic history. It is not financial advice and does not recommend any investment, product or course of action.